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Canada's External Constitution and Its 
Democratic Deficit 
STEPHEN CLARKSON AND STEPAN wooo* 
One of the international system's most striking developments during the 
last half-century is the vast proliferation of international organizations 
(IOs). These IOs are generally presented individually as addressing almost 
every imaginable policy issue concerning the global public domain, such 
as managing international air traffic, dividing up the universal radio wave 
spectrum, establishing a law of the sea, or lending to developing coun-
tries. 
By their very nature, all international phenomena have a domestic in-
cidence. At the same time as they create a transnational sphere of gover-
nance, multilateral institutions created by governments necessarily affect 
the internal affairs of the signatories, whether this is the pricing of drugs 
for their HIV/AIDS victims, the treatment of their Aboriginals, or the size 
of their foreign debt and the interest payments they have to make on it. 
This chapter argues that the best framework within which to under-
stand Canada's relationship with these evolving instances of global gover-
nance is to reframe these I Os in terms of two constitutional expressions of 
their collective significance. 
First, the steady accumulation of intergovernmental agreements and 
organizations has constituted a complex but substantial world order, which 
we can best conceptualize as comprising an emerging global constitution. 
* Much of this analysis evolved through our collaboration as virtual professors at the 
Law Commission of Canada on the paper "Governing Beyond Borders: Law for Canad-
ians in an Era of Globalization." 
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Second, and simultaneously, the global constitution restructures the 
legal order of every participating state by adding an external constitution to 
its domestic constitution, albeit in varying ways and to different degrees. 
These two propositions need both to be amplified by defining constitu-
tion and by elaborating the complexities raised by this expanding dialec-
tic reality in which the international has domestic roots and the local has 
global effects. 
A. DEFINING A CONSTITUTION 
A constitution is the set of fundamental rules and institutional practices 
according to which any organization-whether a small club or a large 
state-governs itself Reduced to its essential features, a constitution 
demonstrates four main components. It typically sets out: the guiding 
principles that guide the community's collective life; the main rules that 
govern members' behaviour; the rights of community members vis-a-vis 
governing authorities; and the functions, scope, and limitations of the 
collectivity's executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. 1 In the realm 
of politics and public law, constitutions are associated almost exclusively 
with the nation-state2-an inward-looking understanding that needs to be 
supplemented by appreciating how international commitments also affect 
the domestic constitutional order. At the same time, as international gov-
ernance arrangements have become more powerful and pervasive, it has 
become plausible to talk about them collectively as giving a constitutional 
character to the global community. 
B. THE GLOBAL CONSTITUTION 
Any consideration of the emerging global constitutional order must pre-
emptively recognize its fragmentary, disconnected, imbalanced, hetero-
geneous, and multifarious nature. International organizations range in 
their territorial scope from bilateral to regional to global, and in their size 
from tiny to huge. Some are relatively autonomous, while others are little 
more than agents for their member states. Some may be quite insignifi-
cant, while others exercise substantial influence over world developments, 
1 For example, Joel Bakan et aL, eds., Canadian Constitutional Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: 
Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 3- 4; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 
1979). 
2 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed. (Scarborough; ON: Carswell, 
2004) at r; Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) at 3. 
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as well as over national governments. They vary from relatively informal 
secretariats to bricks-and-mortar organizations with their own buildings, 
permanent civil service, insignia, and flags (for example, the UN Develop-
ment Program). They include ad hoc arrangements for cooperation in a 
specific functional area (for example, international fisheries management 
regimes) and general-purpose political structures complete with the or-
gans of a would-be world government (the United Nations itself). 
The general trend shows that many international institutions enjoy ex-
panding competences in sectors that once were the exclusive domain of states. 
Beyond enlarging its range, thanks to the formal decisions of their member 
states, the global order has acquired some autonomous capacity to evolve. Al-
though typically established by some kind of intergovernmental agreement, 
an international organization may take on a life of its own with implications 
for its founders. For instance, new rules that bind member states may be 
introduced in the course of an international body such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) carrying out its responsibilities. When international 
tribunals make judgments to resolve a dispute between two governments, 
they often establish new norms that can impact all other countries, how-
ever far away. International commissions reach decisions about new prob-
lems with significant consequences in member states. For instance, food 
safety issues have become burning questions for the once obscure Codex 
Alimentarius Commission in Rome. Although highly technical, the ques-
tions surrounding the approval or labelling of genetically modified (GM) 
foods produced for human consumption involve the fate of many countries' 
agricultural economies as well as the profitability of some of the world's larg-
est corporations, which have invested billions to develop seeds impervious to 
certain insects or plant diseases. Because of public concerns about the health 
implications of hormone-treated livestock and GM fruits· and vegetables, 
agribusiness and governments are defending their positions at the Codex 
in the face of non-government organizations and experts who represent the 
often opposing interests of consumer and producer groups. 
In sum, the hugely complex, multi-institutional international order can 
be analyzed in terms of the four basic components of a constitutional order. 
1. Norms or principles range from the vague (the aspiration for peace) 
to the specific (responsibility to protect). This chapter will restrict itself 
to such norms governing the economic behaviour of governments as na-
tional treatment and most favoured nation. 
2 . The rules emitted by IOs are multitudinous but more specific and 
forbidding, for example, preventing states from exploiting children. Since 
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these rules are negotiated in a power-based process, they naturally reflect 
the interests of the dominant powers. 
In the economic sphere, a great many of the rules reflect American 
norms. When the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
reached an agreement in 1997 on the liberalization of their telecommuni-
cations sectors, the US trade representative Marlene Barshefsky exulted 
that the United States had just universalized its Telecommunications Act 
of 1994 (New York Times, 7 February 1997). The WTO's Trade-Related As-
pects oflntellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) Agreement supported the in-
terests of American, European, and Japanese big pharma, entertainment, 
and information-technology industries, but threatened those of the emerg-
ing economies. 
3. Rights in the global constitution are generally expressed in very gen-
eral terms, such as the right to justice or education or shelter. 
In the economic side of the global constitution, rights become much 
more specific. Many bilateral investment treaties establish the right of foreign 
investors not to have their property expropriated by the host government. 
4. Institutions can be found that are powerful, well financed, and so-
phisticated as in the partly supranational, partly intergovernmental, struc-
ture created by the various treaties that built the European Union into its 
own constitutional order. Other international institutions are quite flimsy. 
Whether strong or weak, international institutions can be analyzed as a 
global collectivity or as individual institutions in terms of their five princi-
pal functions. 
a) Legislature. Taken as a totality, world institutions have a spotty and 
uneven legislative capacity, because their rule-making record is weak. The 
General Assembly of the United Nations is a major global debating forum, 
but its capacity to legislate has been contained by the UN's executive, the 
Security Council. The European Parliament's mandate has grown but re-
mains inferior to the European Commission's substantial legislative ca-
pacity, which manifests itself in the form of hundreds of directives that its 
member states are bound to implement. 
The WTO was born in 1995 with a vast number of rules already de-
cided as a result of eight years' worth of intergovernmental negotiations. 
Its institutional ability to delete, amend, or add new rules takes the form 
of the biennial meeting of its members' trade ministers. However, the re-
quirement that WTO decisions be made by consensus makes it extremely 
difficult to reach any decision acceptable to all-currently 148-member 
.states. As a result, new rules for the WTO are made following years-long 
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negotiating "rounds" between the member-governments, as in the current 
Doha Round, named for the site of the ministerial meeting that launched 
it in 2ooi. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)'s trade 
commission has virtually no rule-making authority: any rule changes 
must be negotiated by the continent's three states. 
b) Executive. Most institutions have an executive group charged with 
managing day-to-day operations as well as making critical decisions such 
as whether the United Nations should endorse a pre-emptive war against 
Iraq. Putting all international organizations together, one of their second 
constitutional functions is the executive-largely because nation-states 
have been reluctant to allow devolve much decision-making authority be-
yond their control. 
The WTO has no executive to speak of, while-NAFTA's merely consists 
of periodic meetings of the three countries' trade ministers. 
c) Administration. If it is to operate, an organization needs a staff to 
implement decisions and deliver the action for which it is mandated. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
UNESCO, and, of course, the United Nations have personnel totalling in 
the thousands. Aggregating them all would show a considerable-but het-
erogeneous and disconnected-international civil service, many elements 
of which are supranational in the sense that their civil servants' careers are 
independent of their member governments' control. 
The WTO has an extremely lean administration: a mere five hundred 
people operate this globally crucial institution. NAFTA has no central ad-
ministration at all. Each of the three signatory states maintains a small 
office to keep track of NAFTA-related paperwork and each federal govern-
ment assigns civil servants to staff a few working groups that deal with 
some ofNAFTA's minor, outstanding business. 
d) judiciary. Norms and rules are subject to diverse interpretations. 
Administrative actions cause compliance complaints. As a result, no orga-
nization can operate for long without having to resolve conflicts generated 
by its own mandate, measures, and mechanisms. Dispute settlement var-
ies from the highly structured European Court of Justice, whose rulings 
have direct effect in each member state of the EU, to the largely ineffectual 
arbitration processes established in the International Labour Organization 
(ILO). 
As we will shortly see when looking at the domestic impact of global 
economic norms and rules, the WTO's and NAFTA's judicial capacities 
can have decisive effects. 
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e) Enforcement. The European Commission's directives can be enforced 
through the rulings of the European Court of Justice, which have direct 
effect in the domestic legal system of the EU's member states. By contrast, 
the conventions of the ILO are unenforceable except by moral suasion. 
Compliance with the WTO's dispute settlement rulings tends to be 
high, in large part because its rules permit economic retaliation against 
states that do not comply with its judgments. WTO rulings are also effec-
tive in part because a member considers it in its interests to comply with 
an adverse judgment, on the expectation that its counterparts will comply 
when it wins a ruling against their trade protectionism. 
This is not the place to develop a more extended analysis of the global 
constitution in all its kaleidoscopic components and uneven functioning. 
The point of this section is to emphasize that, taken as a whole, existing in-
ternational organizations create a global governance system which Canada 
has to take seriously, and for two reasons. 
• First, as an agent in-or subject of-globalization, Ottawa partici-
pates in efforts to reform existing elements of the world order and 
develop new components as needs arise. Canada may have lost rela-
tive position in the global hierarchy of states over the last few de-
cades, declining from being the seventh largest economy to battling 
with Brazil for ninth place, but it remains a player in the upper-mid-
dle range of semiperipheral states that can make a difference in the 
shadow of the more powerful states that bestride the centre of the 
world's power system. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations to 
reform the GATT, for instance, Ottawa made the original proposal 
that led to the new WTO receiving a powerful judicial capacity. 
• The second reason why Canadians should take the global constitution 
seriously is that, as objects of globalization, their own political system 
is significantly affected by having imposed on it what this chapter calls 
a supraconstitution-to the explication of which we will now turn. 
C. CANADA'S SUPRACONSTITUTIQN3 
Because of the many I Os' cumulative domestic impact, the global consti-
tution necessarily impinges on the constitutional order of every member 
3 Much of this analysis is adapted from Stephen Clarkson, "Canada's External Constitu-
tion under Global Trade Governance," in Ysolde Gendreau, red., Dessiner la societe par 
l~ droit/Mapping Society Through Law (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 2004) at I. 
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state but to a degree that depends on its inherent power. In this section, 
we will focus on the extent to which two international economic institu-
tions-the global WTO and the continental NAFTA-have contributed to 
creating an external constitution for Canada. 
The main thrust of economically focused regimes established in the 
past half-century is the liberation of international trade and investment 
from member governments' control. Through global, regional, or bilat-
eral agreements, states commit themselves to dismantling barriers to the 
movement of goods, services, and capital (but generally not labour) across 
borders; to revoking policies that favour domestic over foreign producers, 
goods, or services; and to eliminating all forms of government interven-
tion that distort market competition. All this is implemented in the hope of 
reaping the benefits of comparative advantage, more efficient production, 
lower prices, and greater consumer choice of goods and services. 
Although presented at the time as a commercial agreement, the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA)4 was historically signif-
icant as a step towards a new global investment regime, with fundamental 
implications for the structure of corporate-state relations, and the effective 
constitutionalization of an international corporate "personhood" complete 
with powerful individual rights. 
CUFTA also became a polarizing moment in Canadian politics. On 
one side, was the business community, which saw the agreement as neces-
sary to its survival in a world characterized by declining tariff protection 
and increasing challenges from competitors exploiting economies of scale 
in global markets and minimal labour costs in Third World countries to 
achieve lower production costs: On the other side, was a broad coalition 
of civil-society organizations led by the labour unions and the women's 
movement, which saw CUFTA as a death warrant to the activist state on 
whose public services and programs they believed their collective well-be-
ing depended. 
NAFTA, which was signed in 1993 and came into force in 1994· in 
effect continentalized CUFTA's bilateral regime by incorporating Mexico 
into its then toughened set of rules. Driven by Washington's demands that 
its two neighbours open up their economies by cutting back their govern-
ments' controls, NAFTA strengthened CUFTA's investment provisions, 
extended its rules on services, and added powerful intellectual property 
rights that were of particular importance to American brand-name phar-
4 CUFTA came into force in 1989. 
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maceutical transnational corporations (TNCs). NAFTA partially institu-
tionalized the two peripheral economies' hitherto informal integration as 
territorial extensions of the American marketplace. It is worth noting that 
NAFTA became almost as divisive in American politics as CUFTA had 
been in Canada. Fearing the loss of jobs to Mexico because of that coun-
try's low wages and weak enforcement of environmental and labour stan-
dards, American environmental organizations and trade unions followed 
their Canadian comrades by launching a similarly futile campaign against 
the business-led agenda for continental economic integration. 
A year after NAFTA had established a continental economic regime, the 
long Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations came to a successful end 
with the establishment of a new global economic order in the form of the 
WTO, which transformed global governance by projecting to the global level 
the trade and investment rules wanted for their TN Cs by the core capitalist 
countries. Taken together, the WTO and NAFTA superimposed on Canada's 
already existing internal legal order an external constitution which can in 
turn be analyzed in terms of its norms, rules, rights, and institutions. 
1) Norms 
The WTO and NAFTA establish general principles that are to guide state 
behaviour. National Treatment (NT) is a supraconstitutional norm in the 
sense that it controls government actions because it has been incorporated 
as a superior legal principle in general terms, but not as legislation ap-
plying to specific public policies. For instance, there is no Canadian law 
saying that the federal government must treat foreign-owned furniture 
companies at least as well as it treats Canadian-owned furniture firms . 
. But now that these trade agreements have extended the national-treatment 
principle from goods to investments and then to services, if any federal or 
provincial or municipal government discriminates in favour of a nationally 
or provincially owned firm-whether one that manufactures goods or one 
that offers services, the government of Canada is liable to legal attack by 
another government belonging to NAFTA or the WTO that deems one of 
its companies in Canada to have suffered from unequal or discriminatory 
treatment. In other words, although not implemented in specific statutory 
texts, NT is a supraconstitutional principle on the basis of which NAFTA 
partners may litigate. 
Along with National Treatment, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
norm in GATT's Article I rules out discriminating among trading part-
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ners, even for reasons of social or environmental policy. NT and MFN have 
become supraconstitutional along with countless other international com-
mitments that Canada has made by signing, for instance, the many con-
ventions on labour rights sponsored by the ILO. What makes NT. and MFN 
more important than other norms in the global constitution is the fact that 
they can be enforced, as we will shortly see. 
The domestic impact of these supraconstitutional norms is also grow-
ing because the judicial interpretation of the WTO's principles has proven 
far more expansive and intrusive than that of identical norms had been 
u.nder the GATT. Even when government measure~ are formally neutral 
vis-a-vis nationality, for instance, the WTO may strike them down if, in 
practice, they are deemed to bias competitive conditions in favour of do-
mestic service providers (national treatment) or of particular foreign pro-
viders (most favoured nation).S 
When trying to assess the democratic implications of a country's supra-
c9nstitution, it helps to distinguish process legitimacy from outcome legiti-
macy. The insertion of authoritative new norms into the Canadianpolitical 
order raises legitimacy issues, both in terms of process and outcome. The 
imposition of major constraints on the capacity not just of the federal, but 
also of provincial and municipal governments as a result of a negotiating 
process characterized by secrecy and non-transparency took place with a 
minimum of informed public debate. This absence .of a democratic delib-
eration concerning a major shift in the parameters of the political order 
contrasts with the extensive engagement not just of the political parties, 
the media, and interest groups-the normal actors in a political process-
but also of the highest court of the land from 1980 to 1982 when Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau led a campaign to patriate the domestic Canadian 
constitution into which he intended to introduce a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
Normative additions to the Canadian legal order from NAFTA and the 
WTO had direct consequences in terms of their outcome legitimacy. Na-
tional treatment for investment spelled the end to a whole generation of 
industrial development policies centred on the targeting of subsidies to 
domestic corporations or sectors to improve their competitive performance 
in order to boost their exports. It also called into question the capacity of 
the · Canadian state to impose environmental regulations and bolster its 
) Scott Sinclair, GATS: How the WTO's Expanded General Agreement on Trade in Services 
Will Erode Democracy (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2000) at 44. 
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cultural industries through favouring domestic entities in the private sec-
tor. In this way, supraconstitutional norms have had direct, delegitimizing 
impacts on the domestic legislative and administrative order without most 
of the public-and even much of the government apparatus-understand-
ing this had happened. 
2) Rules 
When we speak of Canada's external constitution, we also refer to those 
rules at the international level that can be said to form part of the ensemble 
of fundamental practices by which Canadian society is governed, and from 
which domestic Canadian laws and policies may not derogate. Identify-
ing all such rules is bound to be a monumental task, given the hundreds 
of international commitments Ottawa has signed. To illustrate the sub-
stance of Canada's supraconstitutional rules, we focus on those contained 
in CUFTA, NAFTA, and the WTO. 
Continental economic integration was paid for by North America's two 
weaker partners with diminished political autonomy. While CUFTA and 
NAFTA did achieve somewhat reduced American tariffs for Canadian ex-
porters, the price Ottawa had to pay for a partial opening of the US market 
was to accept constraints on the Canadian state's regulatory capacity. The 
federal government was no longer allowed to manage a two-price system 
that supplied petroleum products for domestic industry and consumers 
at lower prices than the export price charged to American importers. No 
new cultural policies could negatively affect the commercial interests in 
Canada of American entertainment corporations. 
CUFTA introduced rules reducing Canadian governments' capacity to 
regulate investments, whether foreign or domestically owned. Another in-
novation incorporated in CUFTA was to have trade rules extend far beyond 
the rules for buying and selling physical goods by including services, which 
cover an enormous range of activities, from those traditionally in the pri-
vate sector (for example, banking, advertising, engineering, and' tourism) 
to those normally provided by governments as public goods (for example, 
education, health care, and public utilities). Even if they were not provided 
directly by the public sector, many of these services are closely regulated 
by governments (including environmental, labour, health and safety, and 
consumer protection regulation) and may fall under international rules for 
services if th~y have any commercial characteristics that make them com-
petitive with potential foreign providers of the same service. 
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By the very act of signing CUFTA, NAFTA, and the WTO, Canada also 
undertook to make immediate changes in a wide range of legislation and 
regulations. CUFTA's investment chapter raised the exemption for a review 
of a foreign takeover from $5 to $150 million (CUFTA r988). This required 
Canadian implementation legislation to make the appropriate amendment 
to the Investment Canada Act. 
The WTO's and NAFTA's trade principles can also be unde:i.stood as 
supraconstitutional because they extend legal protection to foreign corpo-
rations-which,. for instance, might consider demands on investors in the 
Arctic to be too onerous or the subsidization of only Canadian firms dis-
criminatory. If they do feel aggrieved, they can press their horn~ govern-
ment to launch a suit against Canada through NAFTA's dispute settlement 
panels or the WTO's dispute settlement board. When Canada persisted in 
showering public largesse on its champion aircraft builder, Bombardier, to 
boost its exports, and Brazil lodged a complaint at the WTO on behalf of its 
own regional airplane builder, Embraer, the dispute panel in Geneva found 
Canada to have acted illegally. Ottawa was obliged to mend its ways. 
While free trade was extremely controversial in the late 1980s, CUFTA's 
process legitimacy was actually quite considerable. Although secret, the 
negotiation process was the subject of intense media and public interest. 
Once the agreement was published, fierce debate over its various provi-
sions continued for months, reaching their climax in the 1988 federal 
election campaign whose results-a majority of seats (if only a minority 
of votes) for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative 
government-gave the accord an ultimate parliamentary legitimacy. Nev-
ertheless, CUFTA's practical outcome-the loss of hundreds of thousands 
of industrial jobs in the Canadian economy's manufacturing centres-left 
it highly unpopular among the labour unions and a number of popular 
grassroots movements, which continue to deem "free trade" an illegitimate 
expression of globalization. 
The WTO's and NAFTA's rules are so comprehensive that, in their 
implementation legislation, their members had to change hundreds of ex-
isting laws. In the WTO's agreement on agriculture, member states com-
mitted themselves to transform such quantitative restrictions as import 
quotas into tariffs, which were then to be reduced. Canada duly proceeded 
to "tariffy" its protective regulations for farmers in central Canada. 
Benefiting from much less public debate and information, the process 
legitimacy of the WTO's and NAFTA's rules remains dubious. Their out-
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come legitimacy is difficult to assess in any comprehensive way, since the 
effects of these rules may take years to become evident. 
Previously, changes in laws and regulations were made by governments 
within the institutional and legal framework established by their internal 
constitutions and in response to demands by .the electorate or by specific 
functional constituencies. NAFTA rules are also supraconstitutional in the 
sense that the signatory governments have to change their laws and regu-
lations in a context that makes them irreversible. Unlike normal amend-
ments to statutes made by sovereign legislatures, which can further amend 
or revoke their acts in response to changing domestic considerations, stat-
utory amendments incorporating international trade norms can be validly 
changed only if the external regime changes its rules by international 
agreement. What would otherwise be democratically legitimate measures 
could subject that government to sanctions or penalties if they are deemed 
by the appropriate arbitration procedures to violate the international agree-
ment in question. 
In this respect, not only has the political order been changed by the 
amendments, but the legal order has been altered by introducing legislative 
and regulatory changes over which Parliament no longer exercises sover-
eignty. This is what free trade's proponents meant when they described 
NAFTA as "locking in" neoconservative rules-despite the fact that the 
neoconservative model is no closer to being accepted as a sustainable so-
cietal contract in Canada than it is elsewhere. 6 Even if more activist politi-
cal parties were to win power, they would find their hands tied by these 
internationally negotiated and domestically implemented political limits 
to which their predecessors had committed them. 
Another type of rule whose enforcement is contingent on foreign com-
plaints is the prohibition of governments from imposing conditions on 
foreign investors, requiring them to make export commitments, to find 
local sources for their manufacturing needs, to transfer technology to 
domestic partners, or to guarantee set levels of employment.7 To be pre-
cise, these standards do not actually prevent governments from imposing 
performance requirements on foreign investors or subsidizing domestic 
6 Tony Clark, Silent C01~p: Confronting the Big Business Takeover of Canada (Toronto: J. 
Lorimer. 1997). 
7 Ha-Joon Chang, "Transnational Corporations and Strategic Industrial Policy" in Rich-
ard Kozul-Wright & Robert Rowthorn, ed., Transnational Corporations and the Global 
Economy (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1998). 
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firms-just as traffic laws do not prevent a motorist from speeding. But 
any federal or provincial government that violates these NAFTA or WTO 
norms is vulnerable to a partner state initiating a legal action that could 
result in economic sanctions to compensate for the damag~ from which its 
corporations claim they have suffered. 
The global constitution's rule book is never finalized. A chronic state 
of flux results from the intergovernmental processes of continually nego-
tiating new global rules. At the WTO's Doha Round, for instance, Canada 
was pressed by countries trying to obtain better access to the Canadian 
market for their agricultural products. As a result, Ottawa's negotiators 
agreed ultimately to abandon both the marketing boards (which guarantee 
protection from foreign competitors for chicken, dairy, and egg farmers in 
central Canada) and the Canadian Wheat Board (which gets Western grain 
farmers the best price on the world market by marketing their wheat collec-
tively). Canada is also under severe pressure from the United States to al-
low, through raising its commitments to the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, the entry of transnational enterprise into its public health and 
education systems. This international context of constant pressure to make 
further concessions creates an instability that necessarily puts the external 
constitution's legitimacy in continuing jeopardy. If central Canadian farm-
ers realize that their government cannot protect the marketing boards on 
which their entrepreneurial calculations depend, their cultural security 
vanishes. 
3) Rights 
The corollary of a limit on government may be a right for the citizen. In 
contrast with the EU, which does create direct rights for citizens in mem-
ber states-for instance to sue their own governments before the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the only "citizens" whose rights in Canada were 
expanded under NAFTA were corporations based in the United States or 
Mexico. Under the WTO's Trade Related Investment Measures agreement, 
rights were also created for all corporations based in states belonging to the 
WTO, not to their citizens. The national treatment principle and the right 
of establishment made it easier for firms owned in one country to do busi-
ness throughout the continent. What makes NAFTA supraconstitutional 
in this regard is its creation of a right in Chapter n that gives non-Cana-
dian NAFTA corporations the power to overturn such regulations as those 
designed to secure the health and safety of the citizenry by taking member 
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governments to international commercial arbitration in alleged cases of 
expropriation. 8 
CUFTA's Article 1605 provided that no government may "directly or 
indirectly expropriate or nationalize," or take "a measure tantamount to ex-
propriation or nationalization" except for a "public purpose," on a "non-dis-
criminatory basis," in accordance with "due process oflaw and minimum 
standards of treatment," and on "payment of compensation."9 NAFTA's 
Chapter II contained an identical provision. In the face of Canada's Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms that deliberately excluded property rights (on the 
grounds that they would excessively enhance corporate power which was 
already adequately protected by the common law), this provision created a 
property right for foreign corporations that was understood neither (appar-
ently) by the government nor (certainly) by the public. 
Unlike rights in their internal constitution, this right was not avail-
able for Canadian corporations in Canada, where it can only be enjoyed by 
American and Mexican companies. The more citizens' groups understood 
that foreign corporations had been given invasive rights to nullify domestic 
legislation that were unavailable to Canadian enterprise, the more NAF-
TA's Chapter n became delegitimized, both in terms of its process and 
its outcomes. Also contrasting with a national constitution, the new justi-
ciable empowerment accorded to transnational corporations subjects them 
to no balancing obligations. For instance, there are no continental-level 
institutions with the clout to regulate, tax, or monitor the newly created 
continental market that has proceeded to emerge. Io NAFTA's Chapter II ex-
panded the scope of investment rights without requiring TN Cs to promote 
the public interest by protecting the environment or public health. II 
8 Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Marin, "NAFTA Chapter n: Investment and 
Investment Disputes" (Summer 1996) 83 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the 
Americas 82 at 90. 
9 CUFTA 1988, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Article 1605. 
ro Stephen Blank & Stephen Krajewski, "U.S. Firms in North America: Redefining Struc-
ture and Strategy" (February 1995) 5(2) North American Outlook 9. 
II Steven Shrybman notes that the powerful private enforcement machinery of interna-
tional investment treaties has now been invoked by several transnational corporations 
to assail water protection laws, water export controls, and decisions to re-establish pub-
lic-sector water services when privatization deals have gone sour. s·ee Steven Shryb-
man, "The Impact of International Services and Investment Agreements on Public 
Policy and Law Concerning Water" (Paper presented at From Doha to Kananaskis: The 
Future of the World Trading System and the Crisis of Governance, conference at Ro-
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One minor exception to NAFTA's non-provision of rights to citi,zens is 
the process established under the North American Agreement on Envi-
ronmental Cooperation for citizens to submit complaints challenging any 
member government's "persistent failure" to enforce its environmental 
laws. However, the mechanism established to investigate these complaints 
and the possibilities of enforcing any finding on a delinquent government 
are so weak as to be almost meaningless beyond the value of the publicity 
and the potential shaming effect that the citizen submission process and 
ultimate factual findings might have on a delinquent government. Simi-
larly, the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation established 
elaborate mechanisms formally dedicated to facilitating citizens' ·challeng-
ing a member government for failing to apply its labour laws. In practice, 
trade unions in the three countries have concluded that the scant results 
achieved by pursuing the complicated process have not been worth the 
expensive efforts needed to pursue a complaint. 
Other WTO agreements also contained rights for international corpo-
rations but none for citizens, other than investors. Its agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) required that all 
member states amend their intellectual property legislation and change 
their judicial procedures in conformity with TRIPs' stipulated norms. 12 • 
The external and constitutional quality of these rights can be seen in their 
giving transatlantic pharmaceutical firms the legal justification to have the 
EU successfully take a case to the WTO against Ottawa because its drug 
legislation did not give European big pharma the full patent benefits that 
they claimed were now their due. 13 
4) Institutions 
With the major exception of the European Union, whose various insti-
tutions' decisions can directly affect the behaviour of its member states' 
individuals and corporations, global governance acts indirectly through in-
fluencing the behaviour of the nation states that have constructed its vari-
barts Centre for Canadian Studies, York University and Munk Centre for International 
Studies, University of Toronto, l-3, 7 March 2002) [unpublished]. 
12 Christopher Kent, "The Uruguay Round GATT, TRIPS Agreement and Chapter 17 of 
the NAFTA: A New Era in International Patent Protection" (1994) IO Canadian Intel-
lectual Property Review at 7n- 33. 
13 World Trade Organization, Canada- Term of Patent Protection: Report of the Panel 
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2000). 
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ous organizations. It would be surprising if, in Canada's case, the WTO 
and NAFTA would not have some indirect effects on its political institu-
tions as well as their relationship with civil society. 
Beyond inhibiting federal and provincial governments' previous ca-
pacity for policy action, provincial government powers are deeply affected 
by NAFTA and the WTO. For instance, only the federal government may 
launch a trade dispute and appear in its hearings, even when a provincial 
grievance or measure is the issue. NAFTA and the WTO ·may also have 
altered Canadian federalism's relative powers by realigning them between 
the two levels of government. By making Ottawa responsible for ensuring 
the provinces' conformity to its provisions, NAFTA arguably restored to 
the Canadian constitution a federal power of disallowance that had fallen 
into disuse. In this way it may possibly alter-to a potentially dramatic de-
gree-the country's delicate constitutional balance. 14 NAFTA norms also 
create constitutional abnormalities at the level of interprovincial relations. 
The application of national treatment and investor-state conflict resolution 
to subcentral governments creates the anomaly that provinces, territories, 
and municipalities have to give NAFTA investors non-discriminatory treat-
ment, whereas the Canada Constitution Act, 1982 does not prevent them 
from discriminating against Canadian investors from other provinces. 
Global and continental rules have differing impacts on different parts 
of Canadian society. Take the country's two geographically determined 
types of agriculture. To the extent that the Prairie Provinces are exporters 
of grains and livestock, their farmers can expect to benefit from the WTO's 
agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) standards whose supra-
constitutional norms limit other states' capacity to use health regulations 
to impede imports. As illustrated by the North American dispute with the 
European Union over its refusal to allow the import of beef raised with 
a growth hormone, the SPS norms, if successfully applied, should make 
it easier for Canadian cattle ranchers to expand their export markets. In 
contrast, farmers in central Canada- who supply a protected market of 
national consumers thanks to the quotas established by government-en-
forced marketing boards for eggs, milk, and poultry-can be expected to 
suffer under the WTO rules as their quantitative barriers are turned into 
14 Andrew Petter, "Free Trade and the Provinces" in Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown, 
eds., Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto: Car-
swell, 1988) at 141-47. 
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tariffs, which are subsequently cut to allow more foreign competition in 
the Canadian market. 
An efficient public health system has become a defining characteris-
tic of Canadians' sense of national identity. If the privatization of publicly 
provided services is the product of the services provisions in NAFTA and 
the WTO's GATS (the General Agreement on Trade in Services), Cana-
dian society may risk losing a prime social institution that has played a 
major role in defining its identity and so threatening its cultural security. 15 
Should the impact of continental and global free trade norms cause" the 
accelerated commercialization of health care with consequently increased 
inequality in the treatment of rich and poor, a central element of Canadian 
political culture will have been jeopardized. In this scenario, the external 
constitution's democratically inaccessible rule-making institutions would 
not just be of dubious process legitimacy in themselves but would help 
delegitimize the country's domestic political outputs. 
Instead of developing its social and community cohesion, Canada ap-
pears to be polarizing into a society of those who can succeed in the global-
ized system and a society of those left behind. If this perception is linked 
to the norms and practices of global and continental governance regimes, 
serious repercussions may be felt in the legitimacy of the country's own 
representative system. 16 If the external constitution has "hollowed out" the 
institutions of the Canadian state to the point that it risks being seen as inca-
pable of defending its citizens' interests, 17 the Canadian political system will 
lose credibility at the same time as neoconservative globalization loses legiti· 
macy. Much hangs on the capacity and effects of judicial rulings concerning 
the conformity of domestic regulations with the supraconstitution. 
5) Adjudication 
For a foreign government to litigate a case against Ottawa presumes that 
global governance boasts adequate judicial capacity. This ability on the 
15 Arup writes that "the main thrust of the GATS is deregulatory: it attacks non-con-
forming national government measures." See Christopher Arup, The New World Trade 
Organization Agreements: Globalizing Law Through Services and Intellectual Property 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 96. 
16 Stephen McBride & John Shields, Dismantling a Nation: The Transition to Corporate 
Rule in Canada, 2d ed. (Halifax: Fernwood, 1997)· 
17 Harry Arthurs, "The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?" in Jane Jenson & Boaven-
tura de Sousa Santos, Globalizing Institutions: Case Studies in Social Regulation and 
Innovation (London: Ashgate, 2000). 
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part of one state to pursue another for violating some supraconstitutional 
norm varies widely depending on the IO's own constitution. Global envi-
ronmental, human-rights, and labour governance is notably bereft of adju-
dicatory sinew. The strength of global economic norms, rules, and rights 
is due to the muscularity of the WTO's dispute-settlement mechanisms. 
Whereas the WTO was endowed with an impressive apparatus for adjudi-
cating intergovernmental disputes, NAFTA was created without a suprana-
tional judiciary. Instead, North American governance is distinguished by 
some precarious dispute-settlement processes whose supraconstitutional 
impacts vary from minor (for general disputes between member states) 
to negligible (for trade disputes between exporting a~d importing states) 
to substantial (for disputes between transnational corporations and host 
states). 
a) NAFTA 
i) Chapter 20: General Disputes 
Continental dispute settlement was meant to depoliticize conflicts between 
the three governments through having their differences resolved by neu-
tral arbitrators applying common rules. In this spirit, NAFTA's Chapter 
20 provides for bi-national panels to be struck when the member states 
have been unable to resolve their differences related to issues generated by 
the agreement. Although Chapter 20 dispute settlement was considered 
expeditious at first, 18 later decisions have proven unable to settle conflicts 
without resort to power politics. 19 For example, when it lost a panel deci-
sion to Canada in a wheat case, 20 Washington responded by threatening 
to launch an investigation into Canadian wheat exports. Closure was only 
achieved when US pressure caused the Canadian government to give way 
by agreeing to limit wheat exports dur ing 1994-95 to r.5 million tons. zr If 
such Chapter 20 rulings are unable to constrain the continental hegemon, 
it becomes futile for its neighbours to submit general issues to NAFTA 
18 William J. Davey, Pine and Swine (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1996) at 
65. 
19 Vilaysoun Loungnarath & Celine Stehly, "The General Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization 
System: Is North American Regionalism Really Preferable to Multilateralism?" (2000) 
34 J. World T. 43. 
20 Interpretation of Canada's Compliance with Article 7oi.3 with respect to Durum wheat 
sales, (1993), CDA-92-1807-01 (Ch. 18 Panel). 
21 Davey, Pine and Swine, above note 18 at 65. 
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arbitration. Continental governance then gets delegitimized, being unable 
to deliver for its weaker members the rights for which they "paid" when 
negotiating the original compact. In this respect, the judicial function of 
NAFTA is faulty as an aspect of North American governance because it 
fails to have supraconstitutional effect in the US legal order. 
ii) Chapter 19: Trade disputes 
Had NAFTA created a true free trade area, its members would have aban-
doned their right to impose anti-dumping (AD) or countervailing duties 
(CVD) on imports coming from their partners' economies. In their place, 
problems of predatory corporate behaviour would have been dealt with by 
establishing continentwide antitrust and competition policies. The United 
States refused such a real levelling of national trade barriers that would 
have created a single continental market. It simply agreed to cede appeals 
of its trade-protectionist rulings to bi-national panels that were restricted 
to investigating whether the administration's AD or CVD determinations 
properly applied domestic trade law. 22 
Written into NAFTA's Chapter r9, this putatively binding judicial expe-
dient turned out to be almost as disappointing as its critics had predicted. 
When the United States' CVD action against Canadian softwood lumber 
exports was remanded for incorrectly applying the notion of subsidy as 
defined in US law, Congress simply changed its definition of subsidy to 
suit the Canadian situation. Beyond softwood lumber's long-lasting evi-
dence, 23 Canada has not had a satisfactory experience in using Chapter 
r9 to appeal other American trade determinations. In 1993, for instance, 
there were multiple remands in five cases, which led the panels to surpass 
their deadlines significantly. Furthermore, problems have arisen over the 
lack of consistency in Chapter 19 panel decisions, which have shown dif-
fering degrees of deference to agency decisions.24 Although AD and CVD 
jurisprudence may have been ineffective in helping the peripheral states 
constrain their hegemon, the opposite is not necessarily true. Canadian 
trade agencies have had to become more attentive to American interpreta-
tions of the standards they apply in AD or CVD determinations out of a 
22 Leon Trakman, Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA (New York: Transnational, 1997) 
at 277. 
23 Robert Howse, "Settling Trade Remedy Disputes: When the WTO Forum Is Better 
Than the NAFTA" (June 1998) C.D. Howe Institute Commentary III at 15. 
24 Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2d ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 1999) at 83. 
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concern for what the bi-national panels, which necessarily include Ameri-
can jurists, may later decide on appeal. 
Thus Chapter I9 confirms the experience of Chapter 20, that NAFTA's 
judicial function is asymmetrical in its impact. On the one hand, it does 
not have supraconstitutional clout over the hegemon's behaviour. On the 
other, it is used to enforce NAFTA rules in the periphery where it has some 
effect on Canadian administrative justice. However, when these processes 
don't satisfy Washington, it can still exercise its raw power to achieve its 
objectives. 
iii) Chapter 11: Investor-State Disputes 
With NAFTA's Chapter II, Canada constricted the authority of its national 
courts by accepting the jurisdiction of private international arbitration 
when American (or Mexican) corporations claim that action (or inaction) by 
a federal, provincial, or municipal government has an effect "tantamount 
to expropriation" of their property. (By the same token, of course, Chapter 
II also gives Canadian companies the right to sue US or Mexican govern-
ments.) Although barely noticed when NAFTA was debated in the public 
domain before its ratification, a then obscure dispute mechanism has es-
tablished a powerful new zone of adjudication to enforce Article IIro.'s cor-
porate rights. Under these investor-state tribunals, American (or Mexican) 
corporations with interests in Canada can initiate arbitration proceedings 
on the grounds of expropriation against a municipal, provincial, or federal 
policy that harms their interests. These "investor-state" disputes are taken 
for arbitration before an international panel operating by rules established 
under the aegis of the World Bank's International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for 
settling international disputes between corporations. 2 5 Since these forums 
operate according to the rules and procedures of international commercial 
law, Chapter II disputes actually transfer the adjudication of disputes over 
government policies from the realm of public law to commercial law. 26 
25 Gary Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, "Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Building on 
the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID" (1993) 27 J. World T. 21 at 52 . 
26 For example, in the Metalclad case, the tribunal ruled that the local municipality had 
exceeded its constitutional authority- a judgment that hitherto only the judges of the 
Supreme Court of Mexico had the power to make. Patrick Dunberry, "The NAFTA 
Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A Review of the Latest Case Law" (March 
2 001) 2 Journal of World Investment 15r. 
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Written by trade law specialists in closed hearings with virtually no 
opportunity for public input, Chapter II panel decisions have taken a fairly 
broad view of what is "tantamount to expropriation" and what counts as 
"property," going well beyond what is considered an impermissible taking 
in Canadian law and effectively restricting governments' ability to regulate 
transnational capital in what they see as the public interest. Since Chapter 
II allows American TNCs to take legal action directly without having to 
wait for their government to initiate arbitration proceedings, these firms 
gain the ability to short-circuit what may be lengthy diplomatic negotia-
tions when they consider themselves to have been subject to abuse in the 
neighbouring jurisdiction as well as to avoid having to make their case in 
domestic tribunals where the pleadings would be more transparent and 
the rulings subject to appeal before superior courts. The threat of an ad-
verse Chapter n ruling is sometimes enough to prompt Canadian govern-
ments to repeal offending laws without waiting for a decision (as was the 
case when the Canadian government rescinded its ban on the suspected 
neurotoxin, the gasoline additive MMT) . The result of the various Chapter 
II cases that have been decided is the public awareness that TN Cs from the 
US or Mexico have greater rights vis"a-vis the Canadian government than 
do domestic Canadian corporations or citizens. 
Chapter II arbitrations both shrink the scope of the Canadian judicial 
system and overlay it with supraconstitutional processes that conflict with 
many of its historic values. 
• Transparency is the first victim in this secret world of commercial 
arbitration: even the existence of a case may be kept secret, and the 
public may never learn what has happened or why. 
• Neutrality is the second legal value that falls by the wayside. Since the 
plaintiff investor has the right to appoint one of the three arbitrators, 
the defending government already faces a bench that is substantially 
weighted in favour of corporate rather than public values. 
• judicial sovereignty is a third victim of this extraordinary addition to 
the Canadian legal order. As the corporate plaintiff and the defen-
dant state choose the panel's chair by consensus, it is likely that there 
will be just one Canadian in tribunals adjudicating suits launched 
against federal, provincial, or municipal governments' policies. 
With its intrusive judicial institutions, this dynamic continental eco-
nomic regime creates new levels of uncertainty for domestic governments 
whose elected officials cannot be sure how measures they propose to im-
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plement might be judged in some future trade tribunal. Many critics of 
the new external constitution have talked about a "regulatory chill," par-
ticularly in light of NAFTA Chapter II rulings on environmental matters 
that have given complaining businesses the benefit of the doubt and shown 
little deference to democratically-sanctioned government regulations. This 
suggests that, when a norm of international corporate law comes into con-
flict with a Canadian legal standard, the latter is likely to be overridden by 
the former to the profit of transnational corporate autonomy and with the 
decline in legitimacy of global economic governance in the public's eyes . . 
b) The WTO 
In contrast with NAFTA's judicial processes, which are weak at the govern-
mental level and strong at the corporate level, the WTO's dispute settle-
ment body excludes corporations from directly using its services and gives 
governments a powerful tool with which to enforce the global regime's eco-
nomic rules even against the most powerful non-compliant state. Indeed, 
the key to the WTO's singular importance lies in the power and neutrality 
of its dispute-settlement mechanisms. Unlike NAFTA's Chapter 19 and 
20 panels, WTO panelists are chosen from countries other than those in-
volved in a particular dispute. Their rulings are not based on the contend-
ers' own laws, as they are in NAFTA's AD and CVD cases but on the WTO's 
international rules. They make their judgements quickly on the basis of 
the WTO's norms that they interpret in the light of the international public 
law developed by prior GATT jurisprudence. 
The composition of its panels enhances the WTO's legalistic rigidity. 27 
Panelists adjudicating WTO di~putes are either trade lawyers and profes-
sors of international law who tend to stick very close to the black letter of 
the WTO's texts they are interpreting, or they are middle~level diplomats 
who take their cues from the Secretariat's legal staff. In either case, they 
know full well that their judgment will be appealed by the losing side and 
that the judges on the Appellate Body will be responding to highly refined 
legal reasoning. 28 
27 J.H.H. Weiler, "The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats' Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy ofWTO Dispute Settlement" (zoor) 35 J. World T. 
191 at 194· 
28 Raj Bhala, "The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law" (1999) 14 Am. 
U. Int'l L. Rev 845 at 847; David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, "The WTO Legal 
System : Sources ofLaw" (19 98) 92 Am . J. Int'l L. 398 at 405. 
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While WTO Appellate Body rulings are not formally precedent-setting, 
it is generally recognized that the logic of one panel's decision can be car-
ried over from case to case as the situation dictates. Palmeter and Mavroidis 
also note that the Appellate Body "operates on a 'collegial' basis. While only 
three of the seven members sit on any one 'division' to hear a particular ap-
peal, and the division retains full\authority to decide the case, views on the 
issues are shared with the other Appellate Body members before a decision 
is reached. Consequently, members of the Appellate Body, in confronting 
prior decisions, are far more likely to be confronting their own legal logic, 
or that of their close colleagues, than are WTO panellists. This relationship 
seems likely to lead to a stronger attachment to the reasoning and results 
of those decisions."2 9 Under these conditions, "soft" arguments defend-
ing cultural autonomy or environmental sustainability hold little weight 
against the "hard" logic of the WTO's rules. 
While the WTO's rules create new supraconstitutional norms for mem-
ber states to accept, their meaning cannot be anticipated with any certainty. 
In referring to one contentious concept in trade law, the WTO's Appellate 
Body memorably compared the notion of"likeness" to "an accordion, which 
may be stretched wide or squeezed tight as the case requires." This judicial 
flexibility did not guarantee cultural sensitivity, as Canadians discovered 
when the WTO ruled that Sports Illustrated Canada (though filled with 
American content) was "like" Maclean's magazine (which was written by 
Canadian journalists for a Canadian readership).3° This judgment meant 
that several key policy instruments, which had successfully promoted a Ca-
nadian magazine industry for several decades, were declared invalid.31 The 
permanent threat of a WTO court challenge of their regulations means that 
national policy-makers can only be sure that they will never know what this 
supreme court of commercial law will decide until a trade dispute concern-
ing this policy is heard.32 
As any student of federalism knows, a system containing more than 
one order of jurisdiction creates conflicts between the cohabiting authori-
29 Palmeter & Mavroidis, ibid. 
30 World Trade Organization, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals: Ruling 
by the Appellate Body (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 1997). 
31 Daniel Schwanen, "The Summer of Our (Canadian) Content: Thinking About Cana-
da's Response to the WTO Magazine Decision" (29 June 1998) C.D. Howe Institute 
Backgrounder at 29. 
32 Robert Howse & Donald Regan, "The Product/Process Distinction-An Illusory Basis 
for Disciplining Unilateralism in Trade Policy" (2000) II Eur. J. Int'l Law 249 at 268. 
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ties. Whether the WTO rulings' supraconstitutional superiority over their 
own constitutional norms will be accepted by Canadian courts remains to 
be seen. No case has yet been brought to Canada's Supreme Court to test 
whether a ruling by a global or continental dispute panel takes precedence 
over a Canadian norm)3 The introduction of a supraconstitution with judicial 
muscle suggests that continuing clashes between the external and internal 
constitutional orders must be expected. If, as further global limits on gov-
ernment are negotiated in the Doha Round, the federal government agrees 
to let education and health care be brought under the aegis of the GATS, it 
would affect the provincial constitutional order more than the federal. This 
action might also be of dubious constitutional validity since it would lead 
to a change in the norms governing the provinces without the appropriate 
amendment having been made in Canada's internal constitution. 
Conflict can also be anticipated between the global and continental 
orders. The United States, for instance, challenged Canada's tariffication 
of its agricultural quotas as a violation of its NAFTA obligations.34 The 
NAFTA panel ruled that the WTO's tariffication imperative prevailed.35 
Other conflicts between the two regimes' norms are bound to occur, com-
plicating their constitutionalizing impact on their members. 
The WTO's dispute-settlement system may be superior to NAFTA's in 
many respects, but multilateralism does not necessarily present Canada 
with a real escape from US pressure. Indeed; much of the constraint that 
the WTO imposed on the Canadian state in the first few years of its exis-
tence was an application of US-driven demands that Canada comply with 
US-inspired WTO rules on behalf of US-based pharmaceutical and enter-
tainment oligopolies. 
The judicialization of trade rules has affected international cooperation 
on regulation in other areas, such as the environment. Before 1990, many 
governments, including Canada's, considered trade sanctions a legitimate 
tool for enforcing multilateral environmental agreements and pushed for 
their inclusion in such agreements. These governments (and many sup-
portive NGOs and business groups) wished to apply the "teeth" of the trade 
33 A constitutional challenge launched by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers and the 
Council of Canadians to NAFTA's Chapter n investor-state arbitration process is work-
ing its way through the Ontario court system and may ultimately land in the Supreme 
Court of Canada for resolution. 
34 Trebilcock & Howse, Regulation of International Trade, above note 24 at 267. 
35 In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-Origin Agricultural Products 
(1996), CDA-95-2008-01 (Arbitral Panel). 
Canada's External Constitution and Its Democratic Deficit 121 
regime to the enforcement of environmental treaties. They achieved a break-
through in 1987 with the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances, 
which allowed member states to impose general trade sanctions against other 
member states that violate their obligations under the Protocol. Ten years 
later, when states were negotiating the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, 
the Canadian and many other governments had reversed their position and 
actively opposed the inclusion of trade sanctions as an enforcement tool in 
the agreement. Few governments will now openly support the use of trade 
sanctions in multilateral environmental agreements. The conclusion of the 
WTO agreements in 1994 led many governments, which were unwilling to 
take the risk of adverse trade rulings, to fear that the use of trade sanctions to 
· enforce multilateral environmental agreements may violate their trad~-law 
commitments. In this way international trade rules have taken primacy over, 
and inhibit more robust action to enforce, international rules in other areas, 
such as environmental protection. These other areas are thus denied the 
legal and political "teeth" reserved for the rules of economic globalization. 
6) Enforcement 
As with other trade treaties, NAFTA has no enforcement capacity other 
than the parties' sense of their long-term self-interest. If one member state 
does not comply with the judgments that it loses, it cannot expect its part-
ners to do the same. Under the extreme asymmetry prevailing in North 
America, the hegemon is largely unconstrained by such prudential con-
siderations. The United States remains able to flout the trade agreements' 
rules as interpreted by its judicial processes, something that Washington 
has repeatedly done with both Canada and Mexico. 
Like NAFTA, the WTO has no police service capable of implementing 
its judicial decisions. But unlike NAFTA, the enforcement provisions sup-
porting its dispute settlement rulings are significantly stronger.36 Once 
the final decision on a trade dispute has been handed down in which a sig-
natory state's laws or regulations have been judged in violation of a WTO 
norm, the offending provisions are supposed to be changed by the defen-
dant or compensation paid to the plaintiff state. A non-compliant state is 
36 Ostry called the DSU "the strongest dispute settlement mechanism in the history of 
international law." See Sylvia Ostry, "The Future of the World Trading System: Beyond 
Doha" in John J. Kirton and Michael J. Trebilcock, eds., Hard Choices, Soft Law: Vol-
untary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Aldershot and 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004). 
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much more likely to be brought to "justice" by a litigant state because fail-
ure to abide by a WTO dispute ruling gives the winning plaintiff the right 
to impose retaliatory trade sanctions against the disobedient defendant. 
This retaliation can block any exports of the guilty state. The amount of 
the damage inflicted by the retaliation can equal the harm caused to the 
complainant by the violation. This self-enforcement system works better 
in the WTO where there is greater symmetry among the major powers, 
confirming that the global economic regime has a far more substantial 
supraconstitutionality for its members in its judicial dimension than does 
the regional NAFTA.37 
The global constitution has an uneven incidence, depending on the size 
of the state. The weaker it is, the more difficult it is to resist. For smaller 
countries on the periphery of the world power system, financial organi-
zations-notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank-have unapologetically and even dictatorially impinged directly on 
the internal policies of their weaker members, insisting that they radically 
restructure their governments. Having well-governed financial institu-
tions-and long experience in floating its currency-Canada has not been 
subject to the humiliation of these enforced disciplines. 
It has, however, been the object of a process of external oversight that 
keeps the Canadian state's behaviour under transnational scrutiny. The 
United States Trade Representative's Office keeps federal and provincial 
policies under regular review, reporting annually to Congress about Ca-
nadian compliance with the obligations it assumed in NAFTA and the 
WTO. The WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism reviews Cana'da's poli-
cies every two years. This surveillance mechanism presses Ottawa to ever 
greater transparency before the epistemic community of trade liberalizers 
in conform.ity to their neoconservative ideology. At these encounters, Can-
ada's trading partners cannot force it to make changes, but they ask about 
governmental measures that interfere with their investments or trade and 
so put Canada's governing elite on the defensive if it is caught practising 
discrimination. 
37 Robert Howse, "The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel-A Dangerous Precedent in 
Dangerous Times" (July 2000) 3 Journal of World Intellectual Property at 493-508. 
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E WHAT TO DO? 
That the multilateral institutions of global governance are currently fac-
ing a significant set of challenges, or even a crisis, has by now become a 
relatively uncontroversial point of departure. In many accounts, this crisis 
of legitimacy centres on the processes of decision making in multilateral 
institutions, which remain largely state-driven and shielded from direct 
input from or accountability to citizens and non-governmental organiza-
tions. The crisis label also refers to widespread concern about the lack of 
substantive fairness of the policies adopted by these multilateral institu-
tions, which are seen as contributing to the exacerbation of inequalities 
in the world economy between the richer countries of the North and the 
poorer countries of the South. While most agree that a crisis is being faced 
and even that it involves questions of the multilateral economic institu-
tions' perceived legitimacy and accountability, there is no consensus on 
how to respond.38 
As with domestic constitutional borders, the supraconstitution is not 
a fixed entity but one that is constantly evolving as new rules are negoti-
ated and judicial decisions are made by international trade and investment 
dispute settlement. The malleability of the country's external constitution 
raises a question about whether Canada should attempt to change it as a re-
sult of deliberate, proactive intervention. In other words, to the extent that 
Canada is an agent of globalization, what should be its program of action? 
The answer to this question depends both on assessing the global constitu-
tion's strengths and weaknesses and on defining Canada's national inter-
est. In the view of many, the global order's excessively powerful economic 
norms and institutions serve the interests of the major powers and their 
transnational corporations. They may even perpetuate the vicious circles 
that keep the poor in poverty by denying them the very policy tools, such as 
the tariffs and industrial subsidies, that big powers used in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries to industrialize their own economies. The corol-
lary weakness of transnational governance is to be found in the other in-
stitutions of the global constitution, principally the I Os defending human, 
labour, and ecological rights. 
38 Ruth Buchanan & Andrea Long, "Contested Global Governance: States, the World 
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Recommendation: Twenty years ago, a similar study to this one could well 
have recommended that the government of Canada establish a full inven-
tory of the country's international obligations to be used as an essential tool 
by its own policy-makers, by judges working in the judicial system, and 
for the general public's enlightenment. Now that NAFTA and the WTO 
have given international economic agreements supraconstitutional weight, 
what is even more urgently needed is a constantly updated document that 
details exactly what comprises Canada's external constitution. 
While the implications of many of its norms, rights, rules, and institu-
tions remain unclear, public officials as well as the general public, business 
people as well as civil society organizations need to have just as authorita-
tive information about their external legal order as they do about the Can-
ada Constitution Act, 1982. While most citizens will not know or care about 
most of their domestic constitution, accurate information becomes critical 
to them when an issue becomes significant-rights for same-sex couples, 
for instance. Similarly, vast areas of the country's external obligations are 
oflittle interest either to officials or citizens, who need nevertheless to have 
access to authoritative information when the need arises. 
Recommendation: Following this analysis, Canada should strive to re-
balance the global constitution in order to bolster weak environmental, 
labour, and human rights by giving them equivalent weight to its already 
robust economic rights. 
If Canada's external constitution is not to become a source of political 
illegitimacy in its domestic politics, Ottawa must move both to bring trans-
parency to this largely hidden reality and to join with other like-minded 
countries in rebalancing the evolving norms and institutions of global 
governance. While the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade must play the lead role in the latter endeavour, the Department of 
Justice has the responsibility to deal with the former. 
